We further study the security of the quantum bit commitment (QBC) protocol we previously proposed [Phys. Rev. A 74, 022332 (2006).], by analyzing the reduced density matrix ρ . Thus the specific cheating strategy proposed in the no-go theorem does not necessarily applies to our protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum bit commitment (QBC) is a two-party cryptography including two phases. In the commit phase, Alice (the sender of the commitment) decides the value of the bit b (b = 0 or 1) that she wants to commit, and sends Bob (the receiver of the commitment) a piece of evidence, e.g., some quantum states. Later, in the unveil phase, Alice announces the value of b, and Bob checks it with the evidence. An unconditionally secure QBC protocol needs to be both binding (i.e., Alice cannot change the value of b after the commit phase) and concealing (Bob cannot know b before the unveil phase) without relying on any computational assumption.
It is widely accepted that unconditionally secure QBC is impossible [1] - [24] , despite of some attempts towards secure ones (a detailed list and brief history can be found in the introduction of [25] ). This result, known as the Mayers-Lo-Chau (MLC) no-go theorem, was considered as putting a serious drawback on quantum cryptography.
Nevertheless, we must note that the correctness of the conclusion a theorem should not be confused with that of its proof. While a correct proof will surely lead to a correct conclusion, there could also be cases where someone may draw a correct conclusion despite that the existing proof is not sufficiently general. In quantum cryptography, though there are brilliant proofs (e.g., [26] ) for the security of quantum key distribution, for other cryptographic tasks it could be hard to find a general proof showing that a protocol is unconditionally secure, since there could potentially exist numerous cheating strategies. Similarly, it is also hard to find a real general proof showing that a cryptographic task can never be accomplished securely (unless the definition of the task contains self-inconsistent goals), because the protocols potentially existed could also be numerous, some of which may even beyond our current imagination. As for QBC, it is important to notice that all the existing no-go proofs [1] - [24] are actually based on a specific cheating strategy of Alice, as it will be summarized below. No matter un- * Electronic address: hegp@mail.sysu.edu.cn conditionally secure QBC is possible or not, we could question whether this specific cheating strategy can be evaded. If there is a protocol which is secure against the specific cheating strategy in the no-go proofs while insecure against other cheating strategies, then it reveals that the existing proofs of the MLC no-go theorem should not be considered sufficiently general, despite that the conclusion of the theorem may remain valid.
In our previous work [27] , we proposed a QBC protocol and proved that it is secure against some known attacks, while an attack strategy that can break our protocol successfully has yet to be found. Thus the exact boundary of the security of the protocol remains unclear. In this paper, we will further show that the density matrix in the protocol displays a distinct feature comparing with that of the QBC model studied in existing no-go proofs [1] - [24] . This makes it possible for our protocol to evade at least the specific cheating strategy that led to these proofs.
In the next section, we will briefly review the existing no-go proofs of QBC, and pinpoint out that the cheating strategies in all these proofs have the same requirement on the density matrix. Our previous QBC protocol [27] will be illustrated in section III. Then in section IV, we will analyze the density matrix in this protocol, and show that they does not satisfy a requirement on which the no-go proofs hold. In section V, we will elaborate why security can maintain in the absence of this requirement.
sponding to the committed bit b has the form
and it is known to both Alice and Bob. Here the systems A and B are owned by Alice and Bob respectively. (3) The concealing condition. To ensure that Bob's information on the committed bit is trivial before the unveil phase, any QBC protocol secure against Bob should satisfy
where ρ B b = T r A |ψ b ψ b | is the reduced density matrix of the state at Bob's side corresponding to Alice's committed bit b.
(4) The cheating strategy. Once Eq. (2) is satisfied, according to the Hughston-Jozsa-Wootters (HJW) theorem (which also appeared in many different names in literature, e.g., the Uhlmann theorem, etc.) [29] [30] [31] [32] , there exists a local unitary transformation for Alice to map { e
} successfully with a high probability. Thus a dishonest Alice can unveil the state as either |ψ 0 or |ψ 1 at her will with a high probability to escape Bob's detection. For this reason, a concealing QBC protocol cannot be binding.
The most important point for our discussion here is feature (3). We would like to emphasize again that it appears in all existing no-go proofs. Note that in some references (e.g. [10, 19, 22, 24] ), this feature was expressed using the trace distance or the fidelity instead of the reduced density matrices, while the meaning remains the same. On the other hand, it will be shown below that the density matrix in our previous QBC protocol [27] displays an intriguing feature. Though the protocol remains concealing against Bob, at Alice's point of view there will be ρ 2) is necessary for constructing Alice's cheating transformation in the above feature (4), our protocol is thus immune to this specific cheating strategy.
III. OUR PROTOCOL

A. The rigorous description
In Ref. [27] , we proposed the following QBC protocol.
The commit protocol: [commit(b)] (C1) Alice and Bob first agree on a security parameter s, then DO s i=1 Alice picks θ i ∈ (0, π/2) (θ i needs not to be different for each i. For example, Alice can fix θ i = π/4 throughout the whole protocol) and randomly picks q i ∈ {0, 1}, and prepares an entangled state
Then she sends the quantum register β i to Bob and stores α i . Here |x α and |y α are two orthogonal states of the quantum register α i , while we use |p i , q i β to denote the state of β i , with p i denoting the basis and q i labelling the different states in the same basis. The state |0, 0 and |0, 1 are orthogonal to each other, and |1, 0 ≡ (|0, 0 + |0, 1 )/ √ 2, |1, 1 ≡ (|0, 0 − |0, 1 )/ √ 2; (C2) Bob chooses a number s ′ (0 ≤ s ′ < s) and randomly divides S ≡ {1, ..., s} into two subsets S ′ and S ′′ such that |S ′ | = s ′ , S ′′ = S − S ′ . Then for ∀i ∈ S ′ Bob stores β i unmeasured. And for ∀i ∈ S ′′ Bob randomly picks a basis p ′ i ∈ {0, 1} and measures β i . The outcome is denoted as |p
and announces to Alice the "fake" result {|p
she measures α i in the basis (|x α , |y α ). She sets p i = 0 if she finds |x α or p i = 1 if she finds |y α . Then she sets L = {i ∈ M |p i = p 
Thus by checking whether |M | − |L| < s/4 Alice can test whether Bob has indeed chosen (C7) Alice and Bob complete the commitment with the codeword method similar to that of the BCJL protocol [33] by using c 0 to encode the codeword (c 0 itself is not announced to Bob). That is:
(C7.1) Bob chooses a binary linear (n, k, d)-code C and announces it to Alice, where the ratios d/n and k/n are agreed on by both Alice and Bob; (C7.2) Alice chooses a nonzero random n-bit string r = (r 1 r 2 ...r n ) ∈ {0, 1} n and announces it to Bob; (C7.3) Now Alice has in mind the value of the bit b that she wants to commit. Then she chooses a random n-bit codeword c = (c 1 c 2 ...c n ) from C such that c ⊙ r = b (U2) Alice sends the quantum registers {α i |i ∈ U } to Bob; (U3) Bob finishes the measurement on {α i |i ∈ U } and
(U5) Bob checks b = c ⊙ r and (c is a codeword).
B. Notes
Since it is an important theoretical problem whether secure QBC exists, here the feasibility of the protocol is not what we care of. Thus we do not consider the presence of detection error, channel noise, or any other implementation issue.
In Ref. [27] we used to require Bob to choose 0 < f a , f b , f c < 1/4 in step (C3). The purpose is to prevent Bob from delaying his measurement too often, because if he announces the "fake" result |p was written we did not know whether Bob will be benefited if he delays the measurement, so we introduced the requirement 0 < f a , f b , f c < 1/4. But now we know that Bob cannot cheat even if the measurement was delayed, as it will be elaborated later in this paper. Thus we can remove this requirement from now on.
C. An easy understanding
As the no-go proofs has been widely accepted for more than a decade and a half, if there is a loophole, it must be lying somewhere subtle. Thus it is not surprising that a counter-example would look very complicated. To fully understand how the above protocol works, it is strongly recommend to read Ref. [27] in detail. For easier comprehension, some main ideas will be outlined below. But for any security debate in the future, it is important to always get back to the above rigorous mathematical description, as the security of a protocol will depend heavily on its details.
The main part of the above commit protocol is to force Alice to accomplish a lie-detecting task. That is, Alice sends Bob s quantum registers β i (i = 1, ..., s) in step (C1). Bob measures them in (C2) and announces the results in (C3). But it is important to note that the protocol allows Bob to lie when announcing the results. Then in (C4), Alice is required to detect Bob's lies and announces the label i whenever she finds that Bob's announced result for β i is a lie. The total number of lies she is required to detect is
Here f a , f b , and f c are the lying frequencies with which 
Bob announced is not a lie at all, it will be called an honest result when we need to distinguish it from other lies. But in general, for simplicity we will still call everything (either lies or honest ones) denoted by |p
The commit protocol not only require Alice to detect l lies, but also force her to use the optimal strategy. Here "optimal" means that while the total number of detected lies must reach l, Alice should try her best to keep the number of the unmeasured quantum registers α i as large as possible, so that most α i ⊗ β i pairs remain entangled [34] , while only a small portion of them was measured and collapsed into non-entangled product states. As shown in Ref. [27] , when f a + f c < 1/2 and f b > f c , the optimal strategy for Alice is to prepare the initial states of α i ⊗ β i in a non-maximally entangled form as Eq. (3). Then to detect l lies, the number of α i she needs to measure is as small as
Therefore, after l lies were detected and the corresponding quantum registers were discarded, the remaining n = s − l pairs of quantum registers contain m − l pairs of measured ones, while the rest n− (m− l) = s− m pairs remain entangled from Alice's point of view as she has not measured the corresponding α i . By assigning a "0" to each of the unmeasured ones and "1" to each of the measured ones, respectively, Alice obtains an n-bit string c 0 in step (C6). As it is a basic law that entanglement cannot be created locally, Alice cannot change the "1" to "0" in c 0 freely.
Step (C7) further connects c 0 with Alice's commit bit b. Thus Alice is forced to commit once she accomplishes the lie-detecting task.
IV. THE DENSITY MATRIX IN OUR PROTOCOL A. Important hints
When calculating the density matrix ρ B b , two things should be kept in mind.
(i) We only need to study the value when the participants act honestly. This may look weird at the first glance. But we should note that the conclusion of the no-go proofs is: if ρ should not only describe the quantum system Alice sent to Bob (e.g., the registers β i 's in our protocol), but also reflect the influence of classical communication. The latter includes the classical information Alice announces to Bob, as well as what Bob announces to Alice while she accepts without questioning (i.e., Bob can assume by default that his classical information has reached Alice successfully so that she knows the content). This is because the original MLC no-go theorem worked on a scenario without involving classical communication directly. But it is by no means indicating that classical communication can be simply ignored. Instead, they used an "indirect" approach (as named in Ref. [7] ). That is, they treated classical communication as a special case of quantum communication, and replaced them with a quantum channel [6] . Consequently, any protocol using classical information are replaced with a full quantum protocol without classical information. As pinpointed out in section 2 of Ref. [7] , the advantage is that the attack on the new protocol is easy to describe, while the disadvantage is that the attack obtained against the new protocol is not the one that applies on the original protocol. Therefore, to make our presentation consistent with the above description of our QBC protocol (which includes classical communication) so that it could be easier for the reader to understand, here we avoid using the indirect approach, and calculate ρ With the above considerations, let us study the quantum states at the end of our commit protocol. The informations corresponding to the quantum registers β i 's (i ∈ L) were already detected as lies in step (C4) and were publicly known to both participants, so that they are no longer useful and can be discarded. Thus we are interested in the remaining β i 's (i ∈ S − L) at Bob's side. To each of them, Alice has assigned a bit c 
In case (b), |ψ i can be written as
But
C. Type a lies
Suppose that Bob's fake result |p 
we can see that in the current case, Bob's measurement in the p 
E. Type c lies
The above results on types a and b lies are already sufficient for our discussion on ρ For explicitness, we briefly summarized the above results in Table I . It is easy to ensure that the d different bits between any two codewords contain at least one bit which is corresponding to a type a or b lie. According to step (C3) of our protocol, the numbers of the types a, b and c lies are about f a s, f b s and f c s, respectively. Eq. (4) shows that the numbers of each type of the lies that Alice detected in step (C4) are about f a s/2, f b s/4 and f c s/4, respectively. Therefore after the commit phase, the numbers of these three types of lies that remain undetected are about
Meanwhile, the total number of honest results are about
Note that the above numbers are all evaluated statistically. Some fluctuation around these statistical values must be allowed. But the tolerable range of fluctuation (that can ensure the protocol work properly with a very high probability) can be estimated using classical statistical theory, so we are not going into detail here. Obviously, the above numbers satisfy the following relationship regardless of statistical fluctuation
Given that Bob's choice of the type of lies is fixed for each and every β i (i ∈ S − L), then if d is larger than the total numbers of honest results (i.e., h) and the type c lies left undetected (i.e., l ′ c ), and the difference is significantly larger than the tolerable range of statistical fluctuation, we can be sure that among the d different bits between any two codewords, there is at least one bit that corresponding to a type a or b lie. Therefore, in step (C7.1) Bob tends to accept a value of d that satisfies
With this d, B(c) |B(c * ) = 0 will always be satisfied for any two codewords c and c * . Thus the two Hilbert spaces H 0 and H 1 are rigorously orthogonal to each other, where H b (b = 0, 1) denotes the space supported by all the states |B(c) 's that corresponding to those codewords c's which can unveil the value of the committed bit as b successfully, i.e., {c ∈ C|c ⊙ r = b}. Using λ c to denote the probability for a codeword c to be chosen when Alice's committed value is b (b = 0, 1), we have ρ 
and applies it on his quantum system B = On the other hand, suppose that Bob tries to calculate P 0 without fixing the type of lies. That is, he exhausts all possible combinations of the types of lies, finds the form of |B(c) corresponding to each of these combinations, and includes all these |B(c) 's into the sum in Eq. (13) . Then the resultant P 0 will be useless for the reason below. As the choice of the type of lies is not fixed, suppose that we first calculate the form of |B(c) by assuming that the fake result |p ′′ i , q ′′ i β for β i is a type a lie when i = 1, and it is a type c lie when i = 2, ... , then we calculate the form of |B(c * ) corresponding to a different codeword c * by assuming that the fake result for β i is a type b lie when i = 1, and it is an honest result when i = 2, ... In this case, for any given i, we cannot guarantee that c i and c * i are corresponding to the same type of lies. So we can no longer make the assertion above Eq. (12) , that "among the d different bits between any two codewords, there is at least one bit that corresponding to a type a or b lie", even if we take d > h + l Thus we show that to construct the projection operator for the measurement to distinguish ρ yet. To know this information, Bob is forced to measure the quantum system at his side. But when he did, the state is collapsed in the measurement, so that it is impossible to further perform measurement in another basis to obtain additional information.
Let us elaborate this in more details. Remind that the type a lie is defined as |p is unknown to Bob unless he performs another measurement to identify the types of lies. As the two measurements are not commutative, Bob cannot have the best of both worlds. The only exception, however, is type b lies, which will be studied below.
B. Alice's required d
Unlike other types of lies and honest results, once a type b lie is identified, the value of c 0 i will be known to Bob automatically without requiring another measurement. As shown in Table I , there is no legitimate state of β i that can be unveiled as c Since the distance between any two codewords is not less than d, there will be only one codeword in C which contains these bits known to Bob. Thus he can deduce the rest unknown bits, and learn the complete codeword so that the value of Alice's committed bit b can be deduced.
However, this can be avoided by setting an upperbound for d. Although Alice does not know the respective values of f a , f b , and f c that Bob chose, in step (C4) she knows |M |, i.e., Eq. (5). Suppose that in step (C7.1) Alice accepts a value of d that satisfies
That is, d is smaller than the total of types a and c lies that remain undetected after the commit phase. In this case, among any n − d bits of the codeword, there will always be at least one bit that corresponds to a type a or c lie, i.e., l ′ b > n − d will never be satisfied. Then Bob will not have enough type b lies to deduce the complete codeword, because with more than d bits remained unknown, the possible choices for codewords will increase exponentially with the value of k of the (n, k, d)-code C. As a result, once Eq. (14) is met, the protocol is concealing no matter how Bob chooses his lying frequencies f a , f b , and f c .
C. The existence of d
So we can see that in step (C7.1) of the commit protocol, for their own benefit, Alice will try to lower the value of d so that Eq. (14) can be satisfied, while Bob will try to increase d to meet Eq. (12). Luckily we can have the best of both worlds. Since 
VI. SUMMARY AND REMARKS
We show above that our protocol satisfies ρ 
Also, Eq. (16) ensures that Eqs. (12) and (14) can be satisfied simultaneously, so that the security against both sides can be guaranteed.
It is worth noting that ρ B 0 ⊥ ρ B 1 actually can also be found in some unconditionally secure relativistic bit commitment protocols [35, 36] , where the committed values are encoded with classical data instead of quantum states. As pointed out in the 3rd paragraph of the introduction of [15] , "Kent's relativistic bit commitment protocol does not rely on the existence of alternative decompositions of a density operator, and so its security is not challenged by the Mayers-Lo-Chau result." They make use of relativistic constraints to achieve the security against Bob's cheating. Another previous QBC proposal of ours [25] have the feature ρ B 0 ⊥ ρ B 1 too, as it is built on top of a quantum key distribution scheme based on orthogonal states [37] . Whether relativity is the key of its security is arguable [38, 39] . Our current protocol is completely free from the need of relativity. Its security against Bob is provided by keeping the definition of ρ
B b
secret from him at the beginning.
The fact that ρ B b is unknown without measurement is also an interesting feature that sets our protocol apart from the QBC model studied in many no-go proofs. In the own words of [3] (as stated below its Eq. (2)), "both Alice and Bob are supposed to know the states |0 and |1 . This implies, in particular, that both of them know the states |φ i B and φ (b = 0, 1) in our Eq. (1). In many other no-go proofs, though it is not explicitly stated, we can still see from the details of their proofs that they hold the same viewpoint. But as already pinpointed out in another nogo proof [17, 18] , previously "the no-go theorem asserts (this) without proof", and "this assertion is actually not meaningful". (An amendment to this problem was made in [17, 18] . But it only considered the case where the states are unknown to Alice, instead of Bob, and the proof is still based on ρ Finally, it is worth noting that entanglement plays an essential role in our protocol. In many previous QBC protocols proven insecure by the no-go theorem, the honest participants can execute the protocol successfully by exchanging pure states unentangled with any system at their sides. Entanglement is needed only when cheating. On the contrary, in our protocol even an honest Alice must make use of entangled states to accomplish the optimal strategy to detect Bob's lies. If she prepares every β i as a pure state |p i , q i β instead, and sends it to Bob without entangling it with any system at her side, then she cannot detect the lies with the efficiency required in the protocol. Therefore such an Alice will be caught as cheating instead of honest. That is, our protocol cannot be accomplished without entanglement. Since entanglement is a typical example of nonlocality, this result is consistent with the claim that nonlocality is necessary for secure QBC, as shown in section 7 of [25] , as well as in [40] .
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